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Bradley: Employees Beware: Employer Rights under the South Carolina Trade

EMPLOYEES BEWARE: EMPLOYER RIGHTS
UNDER THE SOUTH CAROLINA

TRADE SECRETS ACT
[A]ndfor secrecy,/... I well believe / Thou wilt not utter
what thou dost not know; And so far will I trust thee. ... *

I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, South Carolina businesses' enjoyed only meager protection
from misappropriation of their trade secrets.2 Prior to 1992, the common law
and contractual agreements comprised the only relevant sources of South
Carolina trade secret law. Without a statutory solution to the problem of trade
secret misappropriation, South Carolina businesses had reason to be concerned
about protection of their trade secrets. In 1992, to facilitate legal protection of
these vital assets, South Carolina became the thirty-ninth jurisdiction to adopt
legislation based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Uniform Act).' In 1997,
the General Assembly, apparently not satisfied with the Uniform Act's breadth,
enacted the South Carolina Trade Secrets Act (Trade Secrets Act).4 The Trade
Secrets Act arguably establishes the most comprehensive compilation oftrade

* WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act

2, sc. 3.
Univ.
Soc'y
1901).
lines 112-15 (Booklovers ed., The
1. Throughout this article the author uses the term "business" to include all forms of
businesses, including corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and non-profit
enterprises. The South Carolina Trade Secrets Act, by omission of any term of art, appears to
apply to all such entities.
2. See Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322,333, 191 S.E.2d 761,767 (1972) (per
curiam) (refusing to enjoin the defendants' future use of plaintiff's trade secrets but allowing
plaintiff to recover damages that resulted from misappropriation). Lowndes is the only case in
which a South Carolina court has recognized that a business's trade secrets were misappropriated.
3. UNIr. TRADE SECRETS ACr (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990). In 1991, Professor
Day of the University of South Carolina School of Law noted that thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia had adopted the Uniform Act and remarked: "The time has come for South
Carolina to join the growing list of states that have already adopted, or are in the process of
adopting, the [Uniform Act]." Richard E. Day, Protectionof Trade Secrets in South Carolina,
42 S.C. L. REv. 689, 693 (1991). South Carolina responded the next year by enacting its version
of the Uniform Act. See S.C. CODEANN. §§ 39-8-1 to -11 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (repealed
1997). Ohio, Missouri, and Vermont, have since followed suit. South Carolina's version varied
slightly from the Uniform Act, though not in substance. In comparison, the South Carolina Trade
Secrets Act includes several additional provisions unique to statutory trade secret law. See infra
notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The Trade Secrets Act
repealed the statutory sections that comprised the former act.
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secret laws in the United States. Accordingly, South Carolina's trade secret
laws now provide significant protection to businesses operating within the state.
The 1997 legislation specifically addresses employee misappropriation of
trade secrets.' The provision enumerates both an employee's duty to refrain
from using or disclosing an employer's trade secrets and the remedies afforded
an employer when its employee breaches those duties.6 Traditionally, the
employer-employee relationship was governed by the common law, which in
some cases was supplemented by private agreements between the parties.' The
Trade Secrets Act preempts the common law when they are in conflict;
however, the common law supplements the Act when the statutory provisions
are inadequate! The Act has thus become a third source of trade secret law in
South Carolina.
Business competition makes trade secrets significant assets. However, not
every process or method used by a business constitutes a protectable trade
secret. While a trade secret must be secret, 9 absolute secrecy is not required.'
Without sacrificing protection, the owner of a trade secret may disclose it to
another 'in confidence, and under an implied obligation not to use or disclose
it.'" Accordingly, an employer may properly disclose its secrets to its

5. Section 39-8-30, which is unique to South Carolina, states in relevant part:
(A)A trade secret endures and is protectable and enforceable until it
is disclosed or discovered by proper means.
(B) Every employee who is informed of or should reasonably have
known from the circumstances of the existence of any employer's trade
secret has a duty to refrain from using or disclosing the trade secret without
the employer's permission independently of and in addition to any written
contract of employment, secrecy agreement, noncompete agreement,
nondisclosure agreement, or other agreement between the employer and the
employee.
(C)A person aggrieved by a misappropriation, wrongful disclosure, or
wrongful use ofhis trade secrets may bring a civil action to recover damages
incurred as a result of the wrongful acts and to enjoin its appropriation,

disclosure, use, or wrongful acts pertaining to the trade secrets.
S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-30(A) to (C)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).

6. § 39-8-30(B), (C).
7. S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
8.See id.

9. According to the Restatement of Torts, "ft]he subject matter of a trade secret must be
secret." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has noted that"t]he subject
ofa trade secret... must not be of public knowledge or of a
general knowledge in the trade orbusiness." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,475
(1974).
10. See, e.g., Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc., 397 S.E.2d 110, 113
(Va. 1990) (stating that the owner of a trade secret may disclose it, even to a stranger, as long as
the secret is disclosed in confidence).
11. Kewanee Oil,416 U.S. at 475 (quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 154, 156 (Super. Ct. 1887)).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/22
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employees as long as the disclosure is confidential. 2
When an employer discloses a trade secret to an employee, the employee
acquires both a common law obligation 3 and, under the Trade Secrets Act, a
statutory obligation 4 not to reveal the information to a third party. Under the
common law, this obligation persists both during and following the term of
employment. 5 Although the Trade Secrets Act does not codify the perpetuity
of the obligation, it does state that a contractual duty not to disclose trade
secrets "must not be considered void or unenforceable or against public policy
for lack of a durational or geographical limitation." 6 Even though many courts
recognized the existence of this duty, a clear standard of employee conduct had
yet to develop.' 7 The common law remained in a state of disarray until the
Uniform Act, promulgated in 1979,8 unified and clarified the case law. 9
Until South Carolina's enactment of the Trade Secrets Act, no state had

12. Id.The Supreme Court recognized that disclosure to employees is a necessary aspect of
the business relationship because only by that disclosure can the trade secret be used as intended.
Ia
13. See, e.g., Vendo Co. v. Long, 102 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. 1958) ("Trade secrets are the
property of the employer and cannot be taken or used by the employee for his own benefit
."); Fisher Org., Inc. v. Ryan, 470 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (Civ. Ct. 1983) ("Employees may not
utilize information obtained through their confidential employmentrelationship with the employer
to the detriment of their employer where the information was obtained by the employer through
years of business effort and advertising."); Berry v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 270 S.C. 489,
491, 242 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1978) ("An employee has a duty of fidelity to his employer.") (citing
Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972) (per curiam)).
14. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
15. See, e.g., Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 586 F. Supp. 704,710 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (upholding
the validity ofa covenant not to reveal trade secrets that lacked atime limit because an employee's
duty not to disclose trade secrets is "temporally unlimited").
16. S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-30(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); see also infranotes 40-43 and
accompanying text.
17. As one attorney has noted, "'So here we find an areawhere the common lawhas fumbled
the ball as badly as a hippopotamus playing tiddly winks."' WILLAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C.
COLLINS, CASES AND MATERLALs ON PATENT LAW 39 (4th ed. 1995) (quoting Tom Arnold's
remarks on "Rights in Trade Secrets that are Not Secret" at the Institute of Patent Law in 1963).
18. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
original version ofthe Uniform Act in 1979. Amendments to the Uniform Act were later approved
in 1985. SeeUNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990) (historical note).
19. A prefatory note to the Uniform Act provides:
Like traditional trade secret law, the Uniform Act contains general
concepts. The contribution of the Uniform Act is substitution of unitary
definitions of trade secret and trade secret misappropriation, and a single
statute of limitations for the various property, quasi-contractual, and
violation of fiduciary relationship theories of noncontractual liability
utilized at common law. The Uniform Act also codifies the results of the
better reasoned cases concerning the remedies for trade secret
misappropriation.
Id. at 435 (prefatory note). See generally Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Needfor a
StatutorySolution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1971) (arguing for a legislative solution that would
provide uniformity to and resolve the confusion surrounding the trade secret laws).
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codified the common-law principles regarding trade secrets in the employeremployee context. 2 By specifically addressing the employer-employee
relationship, the Trade Secrets Act provides significant protection to South
Carolina employers. The trade secrets acts enacted by other states lack this
important addition. Therefore, the problem of employee misappropriation will
persist, at least at the national level, until such a provision is uniformly
accepted.
To fully comprehend the effects that the Trade Secrets Act is likely to have
on South Carolina business practices, the scope of the term "trade secret" must
be defined. Part II of this article provides a preliminary discussion of trade
secrets and distinguishes trade secrets from other forms of intellectual property.
Part III provides an analysis of the Trade Secrets Act and the impact it is likely
to have on South Carolina businesses by first examining how trade secret laws
affect the employer-employee relationship and then analyzing the remedies
afforded employers for employee misappropriation.
II. TRADE SECRET OR PATENT PROTECTION?
Before businesses expend time and resources developing trade secrets, it
is important that they understand the scope of the protection the law affords
such secrets, especially as compared to the protection conferred on patented
inventions. "The outstanding difference is that a patentee has a monopoly as
against all the world, while the owner of a secret process has no right, except
against those who have contracted, expressly or by implication, not to disclose
the secret, or who have obtained it by unfair means. ' 2 ' Notably, the policy
underlying the two realms of law are antithetical: the patent laws seek full
disclosure,' while the trade secret laws by definition command secrecy.
The decision whether to pursue patent instead of trade secret protection
must be made promptly, or the right to a limited monopoly' may be

20. The Trade Secrets Act devotes an entire section to the employer-employee relationship.

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Although the Uniform Act addresses

misappropriation generally, see UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §3 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 455
(1990), it does not specifically contemplate misappropriation by an employee as does the Trade
Secrets Act. See discussion infra Part Ill.A.

The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition discusses trade secrets in depth. See
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEION §§ 39-45 (1993). Particularly, the Restatement
addresses the duty of confidence that an employee owes to an employer and the liability that
results if this duty is breached. See id. § 42; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
21. Tower Mfg. Co. v. Monsanto Chem. Works, 20 F.2d 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1927).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
23. As Justice Douglas noted in Kewanee Oil, "Society... fosters a free exchange of
technological information at the cost of a limited... monopoly." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470,496-97 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In exchange for the fall disclosure
of an invention, the government grants a patentee the right to exclude others from making, using,
offering to sell, or selling the patented invention in the United States for a limited time. 35
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/22
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abandoned.24 If the holder ofthe information wishes to avoid public disclosure,
or if patent protection is not an option, the holder must be able to recognize

whether its processes or devices qualify as trade secrets. Unfortunately, part of
the confusion in trade secret law stems from the lack of a precise definition of
"trade secret."'

For over half a century courts have applied the definition
provided by the Restatement of Torts."' This definition requires that the trade

secret be secret, provide "an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors," and be continuously used in the proprietor's business.27 The
Uniform Act, promulgated in 1979 and adopted by South Carolina in 1992,
posits a significantly broader definition by eliminating the requirement that the

U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West Supp. 1998).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1994); see Lutzker v. Plet, 843 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In
Lutzker the Federal Circuit noted:
The courts have consistently held that an invention, though completed, is
deemed abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time
after completion, no steps are taken to make the invention publicly known.
Thus, failure to file a patent application; to describe the invention in a
publicly disseminated document; or to use the invention publicly, have been
held to constitute abandonment, suppression or concealment.
Id. at 1366 (quoting Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting
International Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citations omitted)));
see also MacBeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Elec. Co., 246 F. 695, 707 (6th Cir. 1917)
(declaring that an inventor had abandoned the right to secure a patent on an invention because he
had exploited the invention for over nine years in secret).
25. As the Restatement of Torts noted, "An exact definition ofa trade secret is not possible."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The Trade Secrets Act provides:
'Trade secret' means:
(a) information including, but not limited to, a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, product, system, or
process, design, prototype, procedure, or code that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by the public or any other person
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-20(5)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
26. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,474-75 (1974) (quoting the
"widely relied-upon definition of a trade secret found at Restatement of Torts § 757, comment b
(1939)"). The Restatement of Torts provides:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or
other device, or a list ofcustomers .... A trade secret is a process or device
for continuous use in the operation of the business.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTE § 757 cmt. b (1939).
27. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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trade secret be continuously used by the business."
Although the Trade Secrets Act retains the definition stated in the Uniform
Act, it adds a provision which recognizes that otherwise de minimis secrets can
nonetheless be protected if, as a collective whole, they make a "substantial
difference" in efficiency or are the basis of a business strategy.29 This addition
acknowledges the divergence of traditional trade secret law from patent law:
an "invention" may be worthy of some protection though it does not satisfy the
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness requirements necessary for a valid patent."
Under the Trade Secrets Act, such know-how may be protected as a trade
secret, with resort to the judicial system in the event of misappropriation.

III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA TRADE SECRETS ACT
A significant portion ofthe Trade Secrets Act reiterates the language of the
Uniform Act. However, the General Assembly added three provisions not

present in either the Uniform Act or any statutory scheme enacted by another
jurisdiction.31 One provision affords protection to trade secret owners during
28. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 439 (1990). This
comment provides:
The definition of "trade secret" contains a reasonable departure from
the Restatement of Torts (First) definition which required that a trade secret
be "continuously used in one's business." The broader definition in the
proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an
opportunity or acquired the means to put atrade secret to use. The definition
includes information that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint,
for example the results of lengthy and expensive research which proves that
a certain process will not work could be of great value to a competitor.
Id.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-20(5)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). This provision states:
A trade secret may consist of a simple fact, item, or procedure, or a
series or sequence of items or procedures which, although individually could
be perceived as relatively minor or simple, collectively can make a
substantial difference in the efficiency of a process or the production of a
product, or may be the basis of a marketing or commercial strategy. The
collective effect of the items and procedures must be considered in any
analysis of whether a trade secret exists and not the general knowledge of
each individual item or procedure.
Id.
30. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1994) (detailing the basic requirements of patentability);
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). In Kewanee Oilthe Supreme Court recognized the
significance of trade secret protection ofunpatentable know-how: "Trade secret law encourages
the development and exploitation of those items of lesser or different invention than might be
accorded protection under the patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play in
the technological and scientific advancement of the Nation." Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493.
31. See S.C. CODEANN. §§ 39-8-30,-60(B) to (J), -100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). No other
jurisdiction's trade secrets act includes the language of these sections.
The General Assembly also modified the Uniform Act's language in other sections, though
not in substance. Most of these modifications add, or attempt to add, clarity to the language.
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the discovery phase of a civil action,32 and another protects owners during
criminal proceedings. 3 The third provision, section 39-8-30, involves the
employer-employee relationship.
A.

The Employer-Employee Relationship

As a matter of pre-Uniform Act common law, employees were prohibited
from divulging trade secrets received from employers in confidence. 4 Because
the Uniform Act does not directly refer to employee misappropriation of trade
secrets, the common law has continued to control.35 In contrast, the Trade
Secrets Act provides that an "employee who is informed of or should
reasonably have known from the circumstances of the existence of an

employer's trade secret" may not divulge the secret without the employer's
permission.36 This permission must be obtained "independently of and in
addition to any written contract of employment, secrecy agreement,
noncompete agreement,nondisclosure agreement, or other agreement between

Compare, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.§ 39-8-40(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("Upon a finding of
wilful, wanton or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights, the court may award separate
exemplary damages... ."),with UNiF. TRADE SECRETs ACr § 3 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 455
(1990) ("If willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary
damages ....).
32. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Although the Uniform Act
likewise requires a court to protect trade secrets during discovery, UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 5
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 461 (1990), it does not do so to the same extent as the Trade Secrets
Act. For a thorough analysis of section 39-8-60, see Mark V. Thigpen, Comment, A New Age of
Discovery: Your Trade Secrets Are Safe in South Carolina,49 S.C. L. REv. 615 (1998).
33. See S.C. CoDEANN. § 39-8-100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). This section directs a court
to issue a protective order "[i]f the court finds that a trade secret may be disclosed during a
criminal proceeding." § 39-8-100(A). After addressing what the protective order may properly
include, this section states that "the court may, in its discretion, take other appropriate measures
to protect against disclosure of trade secrets." § 39-8-100(B).
34. See 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee Relationship§ 123 (1992); see also supra note 13
and accompanying text.
35. The only language in the Uniform Act that might conceivably cover this situation
provides:
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(ii)i disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who
( i at the time ofdisclosure or use, knew or had reason to know
that his knowledge of the trade secret was
(Ii

acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use ....
UNiF. TRADE SEcRETs Acr § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990).
36. S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-3003) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). This language from the Trade
Secrets Act is in addition to the language used by the Uniform Act. See supra note 35.
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the employer and the employee."37
Significantly, the Trade Secrets Act is cumulative with existing contractual
remedies. The Act "does not affect... contractual remedies, whether or not
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret or protection of a trade secret." '
Agreements of the type described in the Act, particularly covenants not to
compete, are widely accepted in business, although narrowly construed by the
courts. 9 Generally, courts are reluctant to enforce covenants not to compete or
nondisclosure agreements unless limited geographically and temporally to that
reasonably required for the protection of legitimate business interests.40
However, this is not the case when the business interests are trade secrets.4'
Section 39-8-30(D) of the Trade Secrets Act codifies the common law
protection of trade secrets by providing that "[a] contractual duty... must not
be considered void or unenforceable or against public policy for lack of a
' As a result,
durational or geographical limitation."42
even a blanket prohibition
against disclosing an employer's trade secrets is reasonable."
However, an unrestrained contractual agreement not to reveal trade secrets

37. § 39-8-30(B).
38. S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-110(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). This provision adopts in
substance the language used in the Uniform Act. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b)(1)
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 463 (1990).
39. See, for exarnple,Almers v. South CarolinaNationalBank,265 S.C. 48,217 S.E.2d 135
(1975), in which the supreme court noted: "[A]greements not to compete, while looked upon with
disfavor, critically examined, and construed against any employer, will be upheld as enforceable
if such agreement is reasonable as to territorial extent of the restraint and the period for which the
said restraint is to be imposed." Id. at 51,217 S.E.2d at 136. The court further stated that"[w]hile
noncompetition clauses are not favored, they are tolerated, if reasonable, to protect some

legitimate business interest, be it trade secrets, trade lists, confidentiality, etc." Id. at 58-59, 217
S.E.2d at 140.
40. See, e.g., Standard Register Co. v. Kerrigan, 238 S.C. 54, 119 S.E.2d 533 (1961)
(holding that a restrictive covenant prohibiting a discharged employee from selling to the accounts
in his former territory for two years was a reasonable restraint of trade). In South Carolina, a
covenant not to compete "will ordinarily be upheld if necessary for protection of the legitimate
interest of the employer, is reasonably limited with respect to time and place, is not unduly harsh
and oppressive, is reasonable, and supported by valuable consideration." Cafe Assocs., Ltd. v.
Gerngross, 305 S.C. 6,9,406 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1991).
41. See, e.g., National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, 363
(App. Div. 1948) ("[Covenants not to compete] may be valid even if unlimited [as to time and
place], to the extent that they are drawn so as to prevent the disclosure of actual trade secrets
which have been learned in confidence .... ).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). A majority of courts have
embraced this proposition without hesitation. See, e.g., Larx Co. v. Nicol, 28 N.W.2d 705, 711
(Minn. 1947) (noting that the majority of courts accept the validity of covenants not to compete
regarding trade secrets, even though the agreements may be geographically and temporally
unlimited).
43. Such a prohibition is clearly proper. Otherwise, employees would be permitted to
disclose their employers' secret information after a certain period of time or outside a defined
geographical area. If employees were so permitted, this would limit the proprietor's perpetual
right to the secrecy of its know-how.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/22
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may be held invalid for other reasons. For example, in Carolina Chemical
Equipment Co. v. Muckenfuss" the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
invalid a covenant not to disclose trade secrets because it was "harsh and
oppressive in curtailing the legitimate efforts of Muckenfuss to earn a
livelihood."' s The court determined that the employer's definition of trade
secret was so broad "that virtually all of the information Muckenfuss acquired
during his employment would fall within its definition."
Frequently, cases involving employee misappropriation arise when the
employee leaves the business to work for a competitor. For example, in
Lowndes Products,Inc. v. Brower47 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that certain employees of Lowndes misappropriated the employer's trade
secrets when the employees left, formed their own corporation, and took with
them Lowndes' secrets.4" Certainly, section 39-8-30 was enacted to expedite the
disposition of such a situation. Section 39-8-30(B) provides, in relevant part,
that "[e]very employee ... has a duty to refrain from using or disclosing [an
employer's] trade secret." 9 However, the section makes no distinction between
current employees and former employees.5" Accordingly, the section
presumably does not apply to persons that are no longer employees."s As a
44. 322 S.C. 289, 471 S.E.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1996).
45. Id at 294, 471 S.E.2d at 724. The clause at issue stated, in relevant part, as follows:
[Muckenfuss] agrees to not divulge any trade secrets of the Corporation.
Trade secrets means any knowledge or information concerning any process,
product, or customer of the Corporation and more generally any knowledge
or information concerning any aspect of the business of the Corporation
which [could], if divulged to adirect or indirect competitor, adversely affect
the business of the Corporation, its prospects or competitive position.
Id at 293, 471 S.E.2d at 723.
46. Id at 296, 471 S.E.2d at 725. Section 39-8-30(D) mirrors the dissent's language.
Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("A contractual duty not to
disclose or divulge a trade secret, to maintain the secrecy of a trade secret, or to limit the use of
a trade secret must not be considered void or unenforceable or against public policy for lack of
adurational or geographical limitation."), with Muckenfuss, 322 S.C. at 301,471 S.E.2d at 727
(Cureton, J.,dissenting) ("Agreements not to divulge confidential information, unlike

noncompetition agreements, may be valid and enforceable under certain circumstances even

though they are unlimited as to time and place.").
47. 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
48. Id. at 333-35, 191 S.E.2d at 767-68.
49. S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-30(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).

50. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, by comparison, does make this
distinction. Section 42, entitled "Breach of Confidence by Employees," provides: "An employee
or former employee who uses or discloses a trade secret owned by the employer orformer

employer in breach of a duty of confidence is subject to liability for appropriation of the trade
secret under the rule stated in § 40 [regarding appropriation of trade secrets]." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrITON § 42 (1995) (emphasis added).
51. The statute should have specifically included misappropriation by former employees to
the detriment of theirformer employers. However, the use of the phrase "every employee" in
section 39-8-30(B) may be interpreted to include former employees as well as current employees.
Indeed, because statutory construction of the section must begin with the plain meaning of its
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result, the defendants' actions in Lowndes may not be covered under section
39-8-30(B) because the misappropriation occurred after the employees
resigned.52 Considering the frequency with which former employees have
misappropriated their former employers' trade secrets, the Trade Secrets Act

should have made this distinction explicit. Because the Trade Secrets Act is
silent on this point, the common law remains the primary source of law, subject
to any valid private agreement between the employer and employee.

Not all employees who subsequently work for a competitor may be charged
with misappropriation for simply utilizing knowledge acquired during their
former employment. Under the common law, an employee may properly take
and utilize the experience acquired while working for a former employer.53
Moreover, although private nondisclosure agreements are certainly enforceable
as to trade secrets, any such agreement that purports to prohibit a former
employee's use of the general knowledge and skills acquired during his former
employment will be invalidated as an unreasonable restraint on trade.' To

language, a court may read the word "former" into the section. Still, to give some words of advice,
"'If [the General Assembly] does not mean what it says it must say so."' A.P. HERBERT,
UNCOMMON LAW 313 (4th ed. 1942) (quoting Lord Mildew in the fictional case Bluffv. Father
Gray).
52. According to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, "[t]he rules governing
liability for the appropriation of trade secrets play a more central role in regulating the behavior
of employees after the termination of the employment relationship." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFARm COMPOmON § 42 cmt. b (1993).
53. See, e.g., Carolina Chem. Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss, 322 S.C. 289,294,471 S.E.2d 721,
724 (Ct. App. 1996) ("When an employee leaves ajob, he is entitled to take the skills and general
knowledge he has either acquired or increased during his employment... ."); see also Structural
Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); American Chain & Cable Co. v. Avery, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 126, 129 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1964) ("An employee has a right to grow with his experience, and he can carry away
for general use his skill and everything that he has learned at his place of employment, except
trade secrets."). In StructuralDynamics the district court noted:
Where the employer assigns the employee to a specific development task
and commits considerable resources and supervision to the project, a
confidential relationship arises that prevents the employee from using or
disclosing the fruits of his research. When, on the other hand, the
developments are the product ofthe application ofthe employee's own skill,
"without any appreciable assistance by way of information or great expense
or supervision by [the employer] ..... he has "an unqualified privilege" to
use and disclose the trade secrets so developed.
StructuralDynamics, 401 F. Supp. at 1112 (citation omitted) (quoting Wexler v. Greenberg, 160
A.2d 430, 436-37 (Pa. 1960)).
54. The proposition has been stated in the negative as follows:
Nondisclosure covenants ... are not restraints on trade.... [They] do not
prohibit the former employee from using, in competition with the former
employer, the generalknowledge, skill, and experience acquired in former
employment. The nondisclosure covenant prevents only the disclosure of
trade secrets and confidential information acquired by the former employee.
Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. App. 1992, no writ) (citation omitted).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/22
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sustain the latter type of agreement would give employers the luxury of
constraining their employees' right to work elsewhere.
Although competitor employers may not appropriate for their own use the

trade secrets that new employees bring with them, the trade secrets may be
obtained by proper means. Both the Uniform Act and the Trade Secrets Act
define improper means55 and provide that secrets may not be so acquired.
Neither Act defines the proper means that may be used to obtain trade secrets.
However, the Restatement of Torts"' and the Uniform Act delineate several
examples of proper means, including independent invention 8 and reverse
engineering.59 Ensuring that trade secrets are acquired by proper means is vital
to furthering the nation's commercial and economic interests in promoting
research and development of new ideas.
For businesses in South Carolina hoping to protect their trade secrets and
avoid misappropriation, "proper means" of trade secret acquisition is not the
primary concern. Section 39-8-30(A) provides that "[a] trade secret endures and
is protectable and enforceable until it is [either] disclosed or discovered by
propermeans. ' Presumably, "disclosed," for purposes of this section, refers
to a purposeful communication of the information by the business.
Accordingly, once the information is disclosed, the business cannot complain
about competing businesses that exploit its former secrets. Similarly, if an

entity discovers the business's technology by proper means, then the business
55. The Uniform Act provides that "'Improper means' includes theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means." UNF. TRADE SERETs ACT § 1(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
437 (1990). Although the Trade Secrets Act retains this language, it also includes breach of
"duties imposed by the common law, statute, contract, license, protective order, or other court or
administrative order." S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-20(l) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
56. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 757 cmt. a (1939). The comment noted:
One who discovers another's trade secret properly, as, for example, by
inspection or analysis of the commercial product embodying the secret, or
by independent invention, or by gift or purchase from the owner, is free to
disclose it or use it in his own business without liability to the owner.
Id
57. UNIE. TRADE SEcRETsAcr § I cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 438 (1990). According
to the comment, 'Troper means include: 1.Discovery by independent invention; 2. Discovery by
"reverse engineering"... ; 3. Discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret; 4.
Observation of the item in public use or on public display; 5. Obtaining the trade secret from
published literature." Id.; cf SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1255 (3d Cir.
1985) ("Matters [that] are fully disclosed... and are susceptible to 'reverse engineering' ...
cannot be protected as trade secrets.") (citation omitted), citedwith approvalin Carolina Chem.
Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss, 322 S.C. 289, 296, 471 S.E.2d 721, 724-25 (Ct. App. 1996).
58. RESTATeENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
59. S.C. CoDEANN. § 39-8-1 cmt. (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). "Reverse engineering" means
to start "'with the known product and work[] backward[s] to divine the process [that] aided in its

manufacture."' Heisley, 753 F.2d at 1255 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470,476 (1974)).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
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that formerly used the technology in secret no longer has the right to prevent
that entity from using the information. Thus, proper means of trade secret
acquisition is a secondary concern in the business world. A business's primary
concern should be taking steps to protect against improper means of trade
secret acquisition, such as misappropriation.
The problem of misappropriation arises all too frequently in the context of
a non-equity employee who has no personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise,
in maintaining an employer's secrets. That employee's only incentive to guard
secret information is derived from the duty of loyalty owed to the employer,"'
a duty that has significance only if an employee is interested in continuing the

employment. When an employee goes to work for a competing company, this

duty is eliminated.62 As a result, employers need additional legal protections
that discourage employee misappropriation. These protections can be found in
the trade secret laws.
B. Remedies of the Trade Secrets Act

The Trade Secrets Act provides substantial remedies to employers that are
aggrieved by an employee's misappropriation oftrade secrets, although notably
less than the protections afforded by the patent laws.63 Under both the Uniform
Act and the Trade Secrets Act, a business seeking judicial protection of its trade
secrets must initiate an action within three years after the misappropriation is
discovered or should have been discovered." South Carolina's adoption of the
three-year limitation embodies the view of the majority of states. 5
Even a business that is prepared to take action immediately after discovery
of the misappropriation should be aware that courts have the freedom to deny
a requested remedy if the business failed to take reasonable precautions to

61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
62. See id. § 396.
63. See supra PartII.
64. UNIF.TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 462 (1990); S.C. CoDEANN.
§ 39-8-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). As the comment to section 6 of the Uniform Act noted,
"There presently is a conflict of authority as to whether trade secret misappropriation is a
continuing wrong." UNF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.LA. 462 (1990).
The drafters of the Uniform Act chose to delay the commencement of the statute of limitations
period ratherthan adopt the "continuing wrong" approach. Id. However, South Carolina adopted
the "continuing wrong" approach through the statutory language that "a continuing
misappropriation constitutes a single claim." § 39-8-70.
65. Of the forty-two jurisdictions that have adopted legislation based on the Uniform Act,
only six have extended the three-year limitations period. See GA. CODEA, N.§ 10-1-766 (1994)
(five years); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/7 (West 1993) (five years); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 1547 (West 1964) (four years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417A61 (West Supp. 1997) (five
years); NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-506 (1994) (four years); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1333.66
(Anderson Supp. 1996) (four years).
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protect the secrets.' While an owner of a trade secret is not required to protect
it from "the unanticipated, the undetectable, or the unpreventable,"67 the
proprietor must do something.6 This pitfall arises only when businesses lack

an understanding of the nature of trade secrets. A business that recognizes its
processes or formulas as secrets will certainly take reasonable steps to guard

them from competitors. When reasonable steps are taken, courts are more
willing to allow recovery for the misappropriation.69 By comparison, failure to
take reasonable precautions necessarily concedes that there existed no secrets

worthy ofprotection.70 Without a trade secret, there can be no misappropriation

and, accordingly, no remedy.
Assuming that the information warrants protection,"' a business whose
trade secret has been misappropriated may bring a civil action 72 to enjoin

66. See Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322,331,191 S.E.2d 761,766 (1972) (per
curiam).
67. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970). In
Christopher,DuPont's failure to protect its secret process from aerial photographs taken during
construction of its facility did not preclude DuPont from maintaining an action for
misappropriation. The court stated: "Reasonable precautions against predatory eyes we may
require, but an impenetrable fortress is an unreasonable requirement, and we are not disposed to
burden industrial inventors with such a duty in order to protect the fruits of their efforts." Id. at
1017.
68. See, e.g., Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1376, 1384
(D.S.C. 1972) (dismissing the complaint because the employer took no action to protect its trade
secrets). In addressing what steps businesses are required to take, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has stated:
"[lI]fthe person entitled to a trade secret wishes to have its exclusive use in
his own business, he must not fail to take all proper and reasonable steps to
keep it secret. He cannot lie back and do nothing to preserve its essential
secret quality, particularly when the subject matter of the process becomes
known to a number of individuals involved in its use or is observed in the
course of manufacture within plain view of others."
Lowndes, 259 S.C. at 331,191 S.E.2d at 766 (quoting J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A. Murphy
& Son, Inc., 260 N.E.2d 723,730 (Mass. 1970)). The court suggested that businesses should enter
into written agreements in which persons exposed to the secret acknowledge its secrecy and vow
to protect it. Id.
69. Lowndes, 259 S.C. at 333, 191 S.E.2d at 767 (denying injunctive relief to an employer
because "a court of equity will not grant injunctive relief in a case where the owner of the trade
secrets did not endeavor to protect itself").
70. See, e.g., Future Plastics, 340 F. Supp. at 1382 ("IThe plaintiff had no trade secret
because it failed to take proper and reasonable steps to maintain secrecy.").
71. See Lowndes, 259 S.C. at 327, 191 S.E.2d at 764 ("The first issue to be determined in
every trade secret case is not whether there was a confidential relationship or a breach of contract
or some other kind of misappropriation, but whether, in fact, there was a trade secret to be
misappropriated."); see also Carolina Chem. Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss, 322 S.C. 289, 295, 471
S.E.2d 721, 724 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the threshold issue in a trade secrets case is whether
a trade secret existed).
72. S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-30(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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additional misappropriation," recover actual damages, 4 and, in the case of
certain egregious conduct, recover exemplary damages7" and reasonable
attorney's fees. 76 The inclusion of the word "and" in section 39-8-30(C)
indicates that the equitable and legal remedies are not mutually exclusive."
This interpretation is consistent with the view taken by courts prior to the
codification of trade secret law in the employer-employee context.8
However, because of a slight departure from the Uniform Act,it is unclear
what type of damages are available under the Trade Secrets Act. The Uniform
Act permits a successful plaintiff to recover "both the actual loss caused by
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is
not taken into account in computing actual loss. '79 In the recently enacted
Trade Secrets Act, the General Assembly retained the substance of this
language but changed the "and" to an "or.""0 This simple change created an
ambiguity because the General Assembly failed to change "both" to "either."
Thus, the Trade Secrets Act now requires "both [X] or [Y]," a provision that

is patently ambiguous.8 If the "or" language is accepted despite the continued
use of the term "both," then the damages calculation reverts back to the oncepopular method described in Speny Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc. 2 In Sperry
Rand the Fourth Circuit explained:

73. S.C. CoDEANN. § 39-8-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
74. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 39-8-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
75. § 39-8-40(C).
76. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). A court may award reasonable
attorney's fees "[i]f(1) a claim ofmisappropriation is made in bad faith, (2) a motion to terminate
an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or (3) wilful misappropriation exists." Id.
77. Section 39-8-30(C) provides that"[a] person aggrieved by a misappropriation, wrongful

disclosure, or.wrongful use of his trade secrets may bring a civil action to recover damages
incurred as a result of the wrongful acts and to enjoin its appropriation, disclosure, use, or
wrongful acts pertaining to the trade secrets." § 39-8-30(C). This language is actually superfluous;
sections 39-8-40 and 39-8-50 make it clear that damages and injunctions are readily available
remedies. In the author's opinion, the General Assembly sought to combine into one section the
duties and remedies that typically arise in the employer-employee relationship, thereby avoiding
what would otherwise be a disheveled organization of the topic.
78. See, e.g., Lowndes Prods., Inc. v. Brower, 259 S.C. 322, 333, 191 S.E.2d 761, 767
(1972) (per curiam) ("Denial of injunctive relief, ., is not inconsistent with allowing a claim for
damages growing out of disloyalty on the part of employees.").
79. UNIn. TRADE SECRETS ACr § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 455 (1990).
80. Compare id.("Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and
the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing
actual loss." (emphasis added)), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-40(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)
("Damages may include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation or the unjust enrichment
caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss." (emphasis
added)).
81. Instead ofincorporating factors X and Y, the General Assembly's insertion ofor in place

of andwould presumably allow only one of the two factors.
82.447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971).
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There are two basic methods

for assessing damages

611

for

misappropriation of trade secrets: one, the damages sustained by the
victim .... and the other, the profits earned by the wrongdoer by the

use of the misappropriated material ....

Ordinarily a plaintiff may

recover either, but not both, because to allow both would permit
double recovery.'

Since Sperry Rand,many courts" and the Uniform Act8 have abandoned
the distinction, finding that both the plaintiff's actual losses and the

misappropriator's unjust gain may be awarded, as long as there is no overlap
of recovery. On the other hand, several courts have retained the Sperry Rand

requirement that a plaintiff recover either its actual damages or the
misappropriator's unjust enrichment, but not both. 6 However, because the
courts can prevent an award of double recovery-which was the sole rationale

underscoring the Sperry Rand requirement-such an analysis is no longer
necessary. In addition, by not limiting the plaintiff's assessment of damages to
a particular route, courts can maximize the potential recovery, thereby
furthering the apparent purpose underlying both the Trade Secrets Act and the
Uniform Act: the advancement of business interests. Hopefully, the General
Assembly has not reversed the position it clearly expressed in its original

adoption of the Uniform Act."

83. Id. at 1392-93 (citations omitted).
84. See, for example, Tri-TronInternationalv. Velto, 525 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1975), where
the Ninth Circuit explained its refusal to follow Sperry Rand:
This circuit, however, in Clark v. Bunker... clearly indicated that the
measure of damages for the wrongful misappropriation of a trade secret was
not limited to the misappropriator's profits, but also included the victim's
loss which might in no way be related to the benefits accruing to the
misappropriator. We went on to say that the proper measure of damage was
no longer damages limited to either plaintiffs loss or defendant's benefit,
but included a combination of both. . . in order to make the plaintiff whole.
Id. at 437. In Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972), the Ninth Circuit rejected an
attempt to limit the measure of damages to the misappropriator's profits. The court noted,
"Appellants' confusion may arise from the rule antedating the unification of law and equity, that
on a bill in equity a wrongdoer would be required to account for profits on a theory of unjust
enrichment, but damages could be recovered only in an action at law." Id. at 1011.
85. See UNIF. TRADE SECRmS Acr § 3 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 456 (1990).
86. See, e.g., General Envtl. Science Corp. v. Horsfall, 800 F. Supp. 1497, 1503 (N.D. Ohio
1992) (quoting the pertinent language of Sperry Rand); Salsbury Lab., Inc. v. Merieux Lab., Inc.,
735 F. Supp. 1555, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1989) ("[While this court must endeavorto see that Salsbury
is made whole, it must do so by basing its award of damages either on Salsbury's loss, or on the
unjust enrichment received by the Defendants.").
87. In the author's opinion, the General Assembly likely did not intend to change its position.
While it changed "and" to "or," it retained the word "both." Thus, the "or" in section 39-8-40(B)
should be read as an "and." See Dague v. PiperAircraftCorp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981),
where the Indiana Supreme Court observed:
While terms of this type should ordinarily be given their literal and normal
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Unlike the confusing substitution of"or" in section 39-8-40(B), the added

language in section 39-8-5088 was clearly an intentional modification. Within
section 39-8-50, which provides for injunctive relief, the General Assembly
incorporated the language of the Uniform Act: "Upon application to the court,
an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but
the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in
order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from
the misappropriation." 9 In the Trade Secrets Act,the General Assembly added
that "[s]uch reasonable period of time shall take into account the average rate
of business growth that would have been gained from nonmisappropriated use

of the misappropriated trade secret."9 Because this average rate cannot be
defined with mathematical certainty, expert testimony will be required to
predict both the state of the misappropriator's business and the growth that the

business would have experienced had the business properly acquired and used
the trade secret. Additionally, the mandatory language in the provision requires
courts to engage in this speculative analysis, which will result in longer trials,
increased litigation, and increased costs.
IV. CONCLUSION

The General Assembly has enhanced South Carolina's trade secret laws by
drafting several provisions unique to its Trade Secrets Act. Significantly, these
unique sections provide a model for other states to follow. For the most part,

definition when it is apparent that the resulting meaning was intended, this
Court is not bound to blindly give effect to the word "or," when a
disjunctive reading of the terms of the section would render meaningless a
portion of the statute. Likewise, the term "or" should not be given its
ordinary meaning when such an application flies in the face of a clearly
contrary legislative intent.
L at 211. Unfortunately, it is not apparent that giving "or" its ordinary meaning in this situation
would "fl[y] in the face of a clearly contrary legislative intent." Id.However, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has previously overridden a literal meaning in favor of one that was more
consistent with the General Assembly's apparent intent. See, e.g, Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307
S.C. 122, 126,414 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992) (refusing to interpret a statute according to its literal
meaning, which would have made a provision retroactive, because it was clear that the General
Assembly could not have intended for it to be so applied).
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
89. § 39-8-50(A); accordUNIF.TRADESECRErSACr § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 449
(1990) (including identical language). The additional period of injunction serves to eliminate the
"lead time" given the misappropriator. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 2 cmt. (amended 1985),
14 U.L.A. 450 (1990). A misappropriator's "lead time" is the temporal advantage acquired over
industry competitors that results from the misappropriation. To avoid an anticompetitive penalty
against an enjoined misappropriator, the injunction is subject to termination following the
dissipation of the misappropriator's lead time. Id.
90. S.C. CODEANN. § 39-8-50(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). No other state's trade secrets
act incorporates this sentence.
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the provisions addressing employee duties and employer remedies will resolve
any open questions that previously existed under South Carolina's common law
or its former trade secrets act. The primary statutory provision discussed in this
Comment affords South Carolina businesses protection against trade secret
misappropriation by their employees through the imposition of a duty not to
disclose.9
The South Carolina Trade Secrets Act provides businesses with the
traditional remedies for misappropriation, including damages and injunctions.
However, when an employer claims trade secret misappropriation against one
of its employees, the Act does not clearly state whether the business can receive
both its actual loss and the unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation,
or simply one ofthe two. This ambiguity makes the proper remedy unclear. To
clarify this uncertainty, the South Carolina General Assembly should amend the
statute's language to make its intention clear. This Comment has suggested that
the General Assembly amend the language to allow the potential recovery of
both measures of damages, necessarily delegating to the courts the duty to
prevent double recovery. Allowing employers to recover both their actual loss
and the corresponding unjust enrichment maximizes their recovery, furthering
the business interests that underlie the Trade Secrets Act.
While at first blush employers would appear to have the upper hand in the
employer-employee relationship, employees may be better situated. 2 Although
the employee has a clear duty of loyalty to act in the employer's best interest,
this duty does little to calm the employer who must disclose its secret processes.
Operation of the business requires this disclosure, leaving the business
vulnerable to misappropriation. Fortunately, the Trade Secrets Act addresses
employee misappropriation and solidifies protection for South Carolina
employers in employer-employee relationships.
Kirk T. Bradley

91. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-30(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
92. For an interesting argument on this point, see Terry A. O'Neill, Employees' Duty of
Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 681, 701-06 (1993).
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